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THESIS: 
Paradiplomacy  in  Practise:  The  Development  of
Paradiplomacy in Quebec, Scotland, and California
1: INTRODUCTION
In  2000  Charles  de  Gaulle  International  Airport  announced  that  its  air  traffic  control
personnel  would  abandon  the  French  language  in  favour  for  the  more  widely-spoken
English  language.  And  although  safety  measures  in  aviation  are  usually  met  with
understanding,  this  particular  move  was  met  with  protest  and  disbelief.  The  French
government has maintained a strict policy on promoting the French language whenever
and wherever possible, and French society is generally not well known for its embrace of
the English language. Still, the voice that was able to convince Charles de Gaulle Airport to
overturn their decision was not a voice that belonged to a Frenchman. 
Even after France lost the colony of New France to the British, the local people in that area
have  stayed  proud  of  their  French  roots.  New  France,  now  called  Quebec,  eventually
became a province within the Canadian federation, but still insisted on a strong connection
with France. That connection grew into a 'special relationship', and that relationship formed
the basis of Quebec forming its own foreign policy, focussed on France. So, when Charles
de Gaulle made their announcement, Quebec was able to convince them that safety was
not harmed by the French language. Not only had the airport in Quebec excellent safety
grades, it also operated entirely in French. And how could the airport of the French capitol
ditch their native tongue, while the Quebecois embraced it? 
The case of  Quebec is perhaps the most explicit  example of  the rise of paradiplomacy
(Lecours, 2002: 105). Paradiplomacy refers to the idea that sub-national actors can and do
intervene  in  international  affairs,  even  though  that  is  generally  considered  to  be  the
prerogative of the national government (Cornago, 1999: 40). Thanks to globalisation and
governance, the responsibilities of politics in general, and foreign policy in particular, have
shifted from the national government to a wide variety of actors. This gives considerable
freedom for  sub-national  actors to shape their  own authority  (Stoker,  1998).  Nearly  all
scholars  that  have  touched  upon  this  concept  agree  that  there  is  a  large  amount  of
potential power in so-called ‘paradiplomacy’  (Chan, 2016; Curtis,  2011; Acuto, 2013). But
even if paradiplomacy has become an international phenomenon, it does not seem to be
uniformly present. And although the theoretical concept of paradiplomacy becomes clearer
and  clearer,  the  more  practical  use  of  paradiplomacy  remains  quite  obscure.  The
knowledge deducted from real life cases are often based on singular and unique cases,
making  the  universal  nature  and  practical  elements  of  paradiplomacy  severely
understudied. This thesis aims to take the existing theoretical knowledge and test whether
or not it holds up in practise.
1.2: RESEARCH QUESTION
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis aims to explore and expand our knowledge on
how, why and when sub-national actors develop paradiplomacy. To that end, this thesis will
try to answer the following research question:
What factors determine the development of paradiplomacy?
The development of paradiplomacy refers to the way in which paradiplomacy is set-up,
conducted and brought into fruition. The factors that this thesis wants to identity refer to
the basic elements that determine how that paradiplomatic endeavour will develop. The
ultimate goal of this thesis is to induce how paradiplomacy develops and how uniformly
this development is. By attempting to find out how uniformly paradiplomacy develops, this
thesis can battle one of the notable blind spots in the research on paradiplomacy; that
knowledge  is  based  on  one  particular  case,  that  is  often  already  renowned  for  their
paradiplomacy. This contribution would help us better understand why, where and how
paradiplomacy develops the way it does.  
2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Paradiplomacy can be described as the involvement of sub-national actors in international
affairs (Cornago, 1999: 40). Paradiplomacy has a lot of overlap with multi-level governance
which is originally a description for paradiplomacy conducted within the framework of the
European  Union  (Dickson,  2014:  694-5).  A  similar  claim  can  be  made  regarding  city
diplomacy, which is essentially paradiplomacy conducted solely by cities (Gutierrez-Camps,
2013: 50). Sub-national actors then are defined as being levels of government below the
central national government. Usually, ‘sub-national actor’ refers to municipalities and cities,
federal  states and provinces.  For the purpose of  clarity,  I  will  refer to the country that
contains the sub-national actor in question as the ‘host nation’, in opposition to the ‘foreign
nation’ with whom the paradiplomacy is conducted. Broadly speaking, paradiplomacy can
manifest itself in five ways; though cultural bonds, by making economic and commercial
agreements,  by sub-national actors banding together against their host nations,  though
soft-power manipulations of the socio-economic and political system, and by using local
policies to indirectly influence foreign policy.
In the first use of paradiplomacy, sub-national actors build their paradiplomacy on cultural,
ethnic,  linguistic  ties  between  them  and  foreign  actors  (Cornago,  1999;  Keating:  1999;
Lecours,  2002).  An often reoccurring case  study in  this  corner  of  paradiplomacy is  the
province  of  Quebec,  which  maintains  close  ties  with  France,  and  in  some  cases  even
influencing the French government on its policies regarding the French language (Lecours,
2002: 105). The reason why Quebec is such a regularly discussed case is because it is an
already  autonomous  sub-national  actor  which  a  clear  link  to  a  foreign  national  state,
something that sub-national actors like Catalonia or Scotland lack. The case of Quebec is
also a good example of the use of protodiplomacy, a form of paradiplomacy in which a sub-
national actor is attempting to gain international legitimacy for its eventual independence
by building strong bilateral ties with foreign national governments. As Lecours points out,
Quebec has been a perfect example of protodiplomacy with its relationship to France in the
run-up  to  its  independence  referendum  in  1995  (Lecours,  2002).  As  this  use  of
paradiplomacy seeks to establish cultural ties between a  sub-national actor and a foreign
power, a considerable amount of pressure is put on the host nation, especially if the sub-
national actor is seeking independence, or when the foreign nation tries to blackmail the
host nation.
The second use of paradiplomacy is for economic benefit. Sub-national actors seek contact
with foreign states in an attempt to find foreign investments, trade deals or other business
related relations. This is usually done when the sub-national actor in question finds that the
national  government  does  not  enough  to  promote  a  specific  local  industry  abroad
(Hocking, 1984: 483). Likewise, the existence of certain valuable resources in a given sub-
national actor raises the chance of said actor using paradiplomacy to promote trade in that
specific resource (Tatham, 2013: 83). Lecours,  in the meanwhile,  identifies four steps of
free-trade promotion between sub-national actors and national states. These forms are, in
order of impact; visits, formal bilateral agreements, multilateral forums, and eventually the
earlier mentioned trade-focussed protodiplomacy (Lecours, 2002: 108-9). One of the more
interesting aspects of this form of paradiplomacy is how it changes the dynamics among
different  sub-national  actors,  their  host  nations  and  foreign  countries.  In  Australia  for
example, a number of federal states competed against one another for profitable trade
deals with Japan. In doing so, they not only gave Japan the ability to play these sub-national
actors off against each other, but also undermined the national trade policies of Australian
national government towards Japan (Hocking, 1986: 482-3). 
The third use of paradiplomacy is to build relationships between sub-national actors in
order  to counterbalance their  national  government's  policies.  Some sub-national  actors
with  shared values  will  cooperate  with  other  sub-national  actors  in  order  to  pursue a
common goal. These likeminded sub-national actors are bound by a common discourse,
will often exchange information and services and are usually active in “issues where there
are easily identifiable principled positions” (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006: 146-7). In some specific
cases,  this cooperation is a form of opposition to the policies of the host nations. This
‘paradiplomatic counterbalancing’, as I refer to it, is seen most vividly in the cooperation on
fighting climate change by a large number of large cities across the world, as they feel that
their own countries do far too  little or nothing at all  (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006: 143). This
tendency  to  counter  the  national  policy  is  strengthened  as  cities  have  more  practical
knowledge and/or different experiences in some areas than the national state has, making
it likely that cities differ from opinion on those issues with their national governments, and
will  seek to  cooperate with cities  in  similar  situations in  order to address those  issues
together. It should be noted that a significant amount of scholars point to environmental
and climate change policy as fields in which this paradiplomatic counterbalancing occurs
frequently (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006: 147; Chaloux, et al. 2014; Eatmon, 2009).
The fourth use of paradiplomacy is through soft power held over the socio-political and
economic system. Influenced by the work on economics of urbanisation, John Friedmann
introduced  the  world  city  theory  in  1986.  The  world  city  theory,  which  is  more  of  a
collection  of  statements  than  an  actual  theory,  focusses  on  how  the  world  economy
became concentrated in urban areas, and how world cities became the dominant actors in
said  world  economy  as  multinational  businesses,  financial  institutions,  trading  and
communication all  became concentrated in a small  number of  urban centres since the
1970’s (Friedmann, 1986; Curtis, 2011). Sadly, the observations of Friedman and his fellow-
world  city  theorists  are  quite  limited  to  the  field  of  economics.  For  this  research,  the
fundamental  issue that  cities  have  become the  absolute  dominant  factor  of  the  world
economy is the main issue that should be taken away from this. Other world city theorists
have pointed out that Friedman’s initial observations were indeed too narrowly focussed
on economics, and forgot that cities also dominate our (popular) culture, entertainment
and news (Hill & Kim, 2000; Abu-Lughod, 1995; Friedmann, 2001). And it is with this claim
that we enter the paradiplomatic side of the world city theory. Taken together, the world
city theory might be used as the fundament for a form of paradiplomacy though soft power
specifically, shaping the culture, economy and socio-political system itself, and influencing
the actors within that system though more subtle methods. 
The fifth use of paradiplomacy is through the various ways in which sub-national actors
participate in international politics indirectly. In these cases, the sub-national actor makes
policies  that  are  predominantly  focussed on the  local  level,  but  are  still  fundamentally
though indirectly linked to foreign policy. To give a few examples; sub-national actors can
declare themselves nuclear free, meaning that they won’t allow any nuclear weaponry on
their soil which can have a significant effect on the foreign policy and defence policies of
their host nation. Similarly, sub-national actors can evict a consulate from their territory (as
San Francisco did to the Soviet consulate after the 1983 Korean Airlines incident).  If  US
courts sentence a foreign national to death, the foreign governments can only plead with
the state government in charge of the execution, and not with the US State Department
who is usually in charge of such diplomatic affairs (Shuman, 1986: 154; Ku, 2006: 2386-90).
These indirect forms of paradiplomacy influence international affairs in two ways. “First, by
pluralising the actors engaged in the governance of security (forcing us to question who
does foreign policy)  and second, by blurring the boundaries between [...]  domestic and
international  (forcing us to question where foreign policy happens)” (Dunton & Kitchen,
2014: 192). In each case, the sub-national actor in question does something that is well
within their  jurisdiction,  but has indirect effects on international  affairs and the foreign
policy making of their host nation. 
Examining  these  five  manifestations  of  paradiplomacy,  we  can  conclude  that
paradiplomacy  has  a  wide  range of  possible  policies  in  roughly  three  fields  of  subject
matter.  Paradiplomacy  based  on  cultural  ties  and  paradiplomacy  based  on  economic
benefit  are  both  strictly  dedicated  to  culture  and  economics.  A  third  field,  political
paradiplomacy,  can  be  seen  as  the  basis  of  paradiplomacy  though  networking,
paradiplomatic counterbalancing and even protodiplomacy. These three fields, which will
be explored in the coming chapters, will be used to gauge the paradiplomatic endeavours
throughout this thesis.
3: RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to find out how paradiplomacy develops in sub-national actors, three sub-national
actors  will  be  examined  on  three  fields  of  paradiplomacy.  The  case  studies,  Quebec,
Scotland and Quebec, are among those sub-national actors who are most likely to develop
paradiplomacy. All three have a history of independence or independence movements, and
all three are part of federal or devolved countries. Sub-national actors in federal systems
have more autonomy than those in more unity states. This is especially the case if the sub-
national actor pre-dates the host nation and thus can claim to be “more sovereign” than the
host, as is the case with all three cases discussed here1 (Hocking, 1986: 483-4). The fact that
all three cases are part of Anglo-Saxon countries, and are all capable enough to maintain a
paradiplomatic  endeavour,  should  minimalise  cultural  and  practical  differences.  So,
theoretically  speaking,  these  sub-national  actors  should  have  a  similar  views  and
experiences  with  the  use  of  paradiplomacy.  If  these  similar  cases  do  not  have  similar
experiences, than it can be concluded that paradiplomacy does not develop uniformly, but
instead is subject to a wider array of determining factors.
How  these  sub-national  actors  engage  in  paradiplomatic  activities  will  be  explored  by
dividing  those  activities  into  three  categories;  cultural,  economic,  and  political
paradiplomacy. These three forms differ from one another on the topics they address, the
methods they use,  and the goals they try to achieve. This separation between cultural,
economic and political forms of paradiplomacy is derived from the sources in the literature
review, and on similar distinctions made by other scholars2. Each category has a number of
specific  uses  of  paradiplomacy  that  will  be  discussed;  the  creation  of  an  international
personality  and  the  availability  of  a  special  relationship  in  cultural  paradiplomacy,  the
constitutional  ability  to  sign  trade  agreements  for  economic  paradiplomacy,  and
1 Scotland was an independent kingdom until the Acts of Union in 1707. California was a short-lived 
independent republic in 1846 before joining the United States. The Province of Quebec was a British 
colony almost a century before Canada was founded.
2 These scholars being Keating (1999), Cornago (1999), Lefevre & d’Albergo (2007), and Criekemans (2010)
protodiplomacy and climate change policy for political paradiplomacy. These specific uses
are, according to the literature, common for sub-national actors, and should therefore be a
good way to measure the basics of paradiplomatic development. The following chapter will
discuss these forms of paradiplomacy in detail, with the study cases being explored in the
subsequent chapter.
The goal of these three case studies and categories is to get a sense of how uniformly
developed paradiplomacy is in most likely cases. This level of paradiplomatic development
is based on if the sub-national actor is actually willing to make policy on that topic, and if
international actors recognise and engage that sub-national actor on those policies. So, for
example a highly developed economic paradiplomacy means that the sub-national actor
attempts to, and is successful in, making international trade deals with foreign actors. A
developed  paradiplomatic  endeavour  has  both  willingness  and  success.  When  a  sub-
national actor shows willingness, but has not achieved any successes, it can be labelled as
paradiplomatic  endeavour  ‘in  development’.  An undeveloped paradiplomatic  endeavour
means that the sub-national  actor has no willingness to make paradiplomacy. All  three
study cases will be classified as either developed, in-development or under developed on
each of the three categories.
4: FORMS OF PARADIPLOMACY
4.1: CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY
The first category is paradiplomacy based on culture, history, linguistics or ethnicity. This
form of paradiplomacy is commonly used for sub-national actors to make friendships with
actors with whom they share some form of shared or similar cultural, historical, linguistic or
ethnic identity. More specific, cultural paradiplomacy is a strategy for sub-national actors
whose identity sets them apart from the rest of their host country. This strategy is used to
strengthen their own culture and identity via a foreign actor with some shared cultural
identity (Keating, 1999: 4-5). This tactic is closely related to protodiplomacy, where a sub-
national  actor  tries  to  find  international  support  for  its  independence  movement  by
strengthening cultural ties with foreign actors. Because protodiplomacy is using culture for
political efforts, we will count it as political paradiplomacy, though the overlap is significant.
Cultural paradiplomacy is frequently expressed through official “sister bonds” that officially
link sub-national actors with one another, student exchange programs, cultural festivals,
and tourism (Kirby et al, 1995: 273). 
The creation of an international personality is an important first step in the establishment
of a successful paradiplomatic effort. Because the national government usually limits the
sub-national actor’s access and legitimacy in international politics, sub-national actors first
have to establish some distance between the host nation and themselves. By creating an
image of a somewhat independent actor,  sub-national actors can put pressure on their
host nation to acknowledge this more independent status by broadening the sub-national
actors’  responsibilities,  while  simultaneously  getting  recognised by foreign actors  as  an
independently  operating  actor  (Lecours,  2002:  104).  And as  Keating points out,  cultural
paradiplomacy is usually focussed on foreign actors with a similar cultural identity. So, the
research  on  cultural  diplomacy  will  explicitly  discuss  the  existence  of  an  international
personality (or lack thereof), and the relationship between the sub-national actor and its
culturally-similar foreign connections.
4.2: ECONOMIC PARADIPLOMACY
In  this  second  category,  sub-national  actors  seek  general  economic  benefits  through
“investments,  markets  for  their  products,  and  technology  for  modernisation”  (Keating,
1999: 4). Nowadays, these efforts are usually achieved by pushing for free trade, and by
inserting the sub-national actors own regional economy into the international  economy
(Keating,  1999:  4).  This  can  make economic  paradiplomacy slightly  more  intimate  than
cultural  diplomacy,  as it  relies on a higher degree of  international  engagement and on
binding agreements on trade. Other forms of economic paradiplomacy include the opening
of trade offices in foreign countries, or sending trade missions across the world. Of course,
matters of economics and culture can overlap. Tourism can easily become an attempt to
make  money  via  cultural  identity.  Likewise,  economic  opportunity  and  cultural
understanding can precede one another. This is common with sister cities, where cultural
motivations tend to pave the way for more commercial activity down the road (Baycan-
Levent et al, 2009). All things considered, this category covers roughly the same topics and
methods as economic paradiplomacy discussed in the literature review
4.3: POLITICAL PARADIPLOMACY
This form describes the policies and actions undertaken by sub-national actors in order to
achieve or satisfy a certain political principle or goal, rather than gain economic benefit or
strengthen  cultural  ties.  This  makes  this  category  more  complex  than  the  others,  and
includes a wider variety of possible actions. The literature review addressed a wide range of
manifestations  of  political  paradiplomacy,  including  protodiplomacy,  indirect
paradiplomacy,  cooperation  through  networks  and  paradiplomatic  counterbalancing.
Protodiplomacy is a form of political paradiplomacy of particular interest for analysing the
three  case  studies.  All  three  have  some  form  of  independence  movements,  and
protodiplomacy is specifically used to strengthen the ties to foreign nations in order to gain
political support for the sub-national actors’  struggle for independence. In addition, this
research will explicitly look at the use of networks and paradiplomatic counterbalancing in
climate  change  policy.  This  seems  to  be  a  common  form  of  political  paradiplomacy,
according to scholars like Betsill and Bulkeley. So,  whether or not the case studies use this
form  of  paradiplomacy  is  therefore  likely  to  tell  us  something  about  their  level  of
paradiplomatic development in general.
5: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
The following chapters will  deal with the actual research and analysis of the cases. The
cases will be discussed one by one, during which all the three categories will be explicitly
examined.  First  is  the  province  of  Quebec,  and  its  cultural,  economic  and  political
paradiplomacy. Then, in a similar manner, the cases of Scotland and California, followed by
the chapter in which the findings are compared and discussed.
5.1: QUEBEC
The  Canadian  province  of  Quebec  is  generally  seen  as  ‘the  master’  of  paradiplomacy.
Quebec  has a de facto independent foreign ministry, including a foreign minister, since the
mid 1980’s. This paradiplomatic service has 30 offices in 18 countries, and is better funded
and has more personnel than all the states in the neighbouring US combined, The core of
this  paradiplomatic  activity  is  the  French  language,  and  the  connection  to  the  French
heritage that comes with it. This helps Quebec set itself apart from the rest of the Anglo-
Saxon Canadian federation, and sees itself as one half of a binational nation (Mark, 2010) 
The Quebecois paradiplomacy finds its roots in the Quiet Revolution of the 1960’s. During
this  period,  the  Quebecois  civil  society  transformed  itself  from  a  “state-less,  insular,
conservative, catholic polity to a modern, open, secular and outward-looking state”. The
transformation of the civic culture during this period brought both a more nationalistic and
international character to the province, and solidified the idea that Quebec was a polity
distinct from the rest of Canada. The notable Quebecois politician Gérin-Lajoie declared
that Quebec was “from a political point of view” a state (Mark, 2010: 70). The same Gérin-
Lajoie gave birth to the so called Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine, which states that “the constitutional
competence of Canada’s provinces over their  exclusive spheres of  jurisdiction extended
even into the international realm, giving Quebec the absolute right to establish its own
international contacts and conduct its own international affairs in fields such as (...) cultural
policies” (Gendron, 2016: 225). In other words,  if  Quebec has the constitutional right to
make domestic policy on a given issue, it has the right to make foreign policy on that issue.
This doctrine forms the legal basis of Quebec’s paradiplomacy (Hillmer, 2008).
The distinctive character of Quebec finds its apex in its independence movement and its
two independence referenda in 1980 and in 1995. The 1980 referendum was quite decisive,
with only 40% voting for secession, and 60% voting against.  In the second referendum,
however, this 20 point gap was brought down to just over 1%. Although the separatists lost,
they did so by only a hair,  highlighting how popular  the independence movement had
become (Lemieux & Noël, 2006).
5.1.1: QUEBEC AND CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY
Quebec’s paradiplomacy, as mentioned earlier, is heavily  grounded in matters of culture,
linguistics, and identity. According to the Quebec Ministry of International Relations, the
province  has  signed 306 binding  international  agreements  on  cultural  and educational
matters,  and  another  31  non-binding  agreements  and  multilateral  conventions  on  the
same issues (Ministère des Relations Internationales et de la Francophonie, 2017).
The French language and heritage form the core of Quebec’s  distinctive character,  and
therefore of its cultural paradiplomacy. The province has a so-called ‘special relationship’
with the French Republic and is an avid member of the Francophonie. The dominant place
of the French language in Quebec is  displayed by the fact  that only a mere 40% of  all
French-speaking Quebecois are also able to speak English (Cornut, 2016; Statistics Canada,
2016). As Lecours mentions, establishing an international personality is a key step in setting
up a paradiplomatic effort. And indeed, during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960’s, Quebec
managed to change its personality from a closed and conservative province to a open and
modern state. Quebec began stressing that Canada was a binational country, with Quebec
being one half of the two polities in the federation. In response, the federal government of
Prime Minister  Pierre  Trudeau attempted to  frame the  Canadian  federation  differently,
stating  that  Canada  was  a  multicultural  country,  with  Quebec  being  one  of  multiple
different cultures. In another attempt to temper the distinctiveness of Quebec, Trudeau
established French as the official second language for entire Canada. In doing so, he made
sure that, on paper, the French language was not limited to Quebec (Mark, 2010: 70-5). And
though Quebec remains a province within the Canadian federation, Trudeau was not able
to halt Quebecois nationalism all  together. To this day, the French language remain the
fundament of Quebec’s cultural character and its paradiplomacy.
5.1.2 QUEBEC AND ECONOMIC PARADIPLOMACY
The legal basis for Canadian provinces ability to conduct economic paradiplomacy is quite
complicated. There are two phenomena at play that allow the province of Quebec a rare
degree  of  freedom in establishing economic  policy.  First,  is  what  Kukucha refers  to  as
‘constitutional  ambiguity’  with  regard to matters  of  economic  as  well  as  environmental
paradiplomacy. Most of this ambiguity, Kukucha suggest, comes from the complex web of
rulings by the constitutional court (Kukucha, 2005: 129-37). The second phenomenon at
play is the earlier mentioned Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine, that allows the province of Quebec to
engage  internationally  on  its  domestic  matters.  Aside  from  economic  matters  that  fall
within the jurisdiction of the province, Kukucha argues that global trade is being perceived
as such a fundamentally impactful matter on the provinces domestic affairs, that having an
economic paradiplomatic policy would be both morally and legally justifie (Kukucha , 2004:
114).  These  phenomena result  in  a  situation  in  which  the  province  is  able  to  operate
essentially independent from the rest of Canada in regards with economic paradiplomacy
(Rioux Ouimet, 2015: 110). This autonomous position of Quebec includes that the province
has to approve international agreements made by the federal government on matters that
are  the  jurisdiction  of  the  province.  As  of  2017,  the  Quebec  Ministry  of  International
Relations claims to have signed at least 142 separate, binding international agreements on
matters that fall within the field of economic paradiplomacy3, while acknowledging only 9
international agreements made by the federal government on the same matters (Ministère
des  Relations  Internationales  et  de  la  Francophonie,  2017).  That  means  that  of  all  the
binding international agreements on economic matters in the province of Quebec, only 6%
are made by the federal government.
5.1.3: QUEBEC AND POLITICAL PARADIPLOMACY
France, and to a lesser degree the Francophonie, play central and pivotal roles in Quebec’s
political paradiplomacy. During the Quiet Revolution, French President Charles de Gaulle
visited Montreal and declared to a square filled with applauding protesters “vive le Quebec
libre”  (Axworthy, 2013).  Understandably, this caused a diplomatic squabble between the
federal Canadian government and the French government. And after this initial expression
of  support,  France  has  remained  more  discreet  in  its  attitude  towards  Quebecois
independence,  adopting  a  principle  of  non-interference.  Nevertheless,  the  ‘special
relationship’ between the two remained, not only as the target for cultural paradiplomacy,
3 The Ministry of International Relations of Quebec has a database of all its 732 international agreements, which 
can be explored by category. It can be difficult to establish which agreement constitutes economic paradiplomacy 
and which does not. However, in order to get an estimate on the number of agreements, I have considered the 
categories of agriculture, commerce, economic development, finances, communications, transportation and 
taxations to fall within economic paradiplomacy.
but also as the basis for its protodiplomacy (Cornut, 2016: 171). In the run up to the 1995
independence referendum, the Quebecois premier visited the French president in Paris,
and was welcomed in a fashion usually reserved for the leaders of actually independent
nations. During this visit, then-President Chirac said that “in the event that this referendum
would be positive (...)  France should immediately stand alongside Quebeckers” (Lecours,
2002: 108p). Then-premier of Quebec, Parizeau, operated with the assumption that if and
when  France  would  provide  the  new  Quebec  state  with  international  support  and
legitimacy, it would not also push the rest of the Francophonie to do so, but also the United
States.  The United States  would,  was the  argument,  not  accept  that  the  French would
“make a crucial diplomatic move in its immediate sphere of influence” (Lecours, 2002: 108).
By  relying  on  its  relationship  with  France,  Quebec  could  legitimise  both  its  quest  for
independence, and, if it happened, its existence as an independent state as well.
Aside from its significant use of protodiplomacy, Quebec also uses political paradiplomacy
in the field of environmental policy. Despite being one of the initial supporters of the Kyoto
Protocol,  Canada left  the protocol  under the leadership of  Conservative Prime Minister
Harper in the mid 2010’s. As a federation, Canadian provinces are free to pursue climate
change policies of their own accord. Quebec frequently  sends its own delegates with the
national Canadian delegation to international climate negotiations, it participates in forums
held  surrounding  those  negotiations,  and  implemented  a  shared  carbon  market  with
California. As of 2017, Quebec has signed a total of 46 binding international agreements on
environmental  matters,  with  another  25  non-binding  agreements  and  multilateral
conventions  on  the  same  subject  (Ministère  des  Relations  Internationales  et  de  la
Francophonie, 2017). By the mid 2000’s, even before actually leaving the Kyoto Protocol,
there  was  “no  such  thing  as  a  single  Canadian  voice  on  climate  change,  neither
international nor domestically. As an international actor, Canada had become a fragmented
entity” (Chaloux, et al. 2014: 307). 
5.2 SCOTLAND
The case of Scottish independence is one of the more prominent contemporary secession
causes  in  Europe.  Scotland was  its  own  country  until  the  Acts  of  Union  in  1707,  with
Scottish nationalist movements gaining some steam with the rise of British nationalism
during the 1970’s, and with subsequent Conservative governments and neoliberal policies
in  the  1980’s.  These  conservative  and neoliberal  policies  were  felt  as  damaging to  the
generally more social and left-wing identity of Scotland, and were a factor for many Scots to
favour a more independent position from the relatively right-wing Westminster parliament
(Law & Mooney, 2012). 
Since 1999, Scotland has its own parliament and government, and has the ability to make
policies on every political matter except the so called ‘reserved’ powers. As of 2017, these
reserved powers include
defence,  constitutional  matters,  immigration,  trade  policy,  and  foreign  affairs (Scottish
Parliament, 2017). Though the first Scottish governments were led by the unionist4 Labour
Party, the Scottish Nationalist Party have been in power for the last decade, and declared a
referendum on its independence. Although the referendum was won decisively in favour of
the unionists, and was supposed to be the only one in a generation, the idea of a second
referendum  popped  up  again  after  the  Brexit  referendum.  While  the  Westminster
government is pushing for a hard Brexit, the Scottish government wants to remain in the
EU if at all possible. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon declared that her government
wants more devolved powers in order independently pursue Scottish national interests in
the  Brexit-age  (The  National,  2016).  The  coming  years  might  prove  to  be  pivotal  for
Scotland’s development of paradiplomacy.
4 Unionist favour a united Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and therefore oppose the independence of any of 
the four countries that make up the United Kingdom.
5.2.1: SCOTLAND AND CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY
Although Scotland has  a  strong cultural  image,  the  actual  cultural  policy  was  mostly  a
centralised matter for the Westminster government until  devolution in 1999 (Orr, 2008:
310). After devolution, then-First Minister McConnell stated that culture stood at the core of
Scottish government activity (McConnell, 2003). This was perhaps a logical and expected
step,  as  cultural  policy  was  the  foremost  matter  in  which  Scotland wanted to  make  a
difference  from the  past  decades under  Westminster  rule.  And although this  focus on
culture has prevailed, the quick succession of different governments in the early years of
the new Scottish government did hamper the development of such policies (Bonnar, 2014:
145). 
When it  comes to creating an international personality,  Scotland strengths its image by
being the polar opposite of England. Whereas England voted for  Brexit,  Scotland voted
against. Especially in the wake of the Brexit referendum, Scottish nationalists framed the
Scottish support for the EU as a sign of Scottish cosmopolitanism. First Minister Sturgeon
repeatedly  stressed  the  value  of  international  cooperation,  the  contributions  made  by
foreigners  in  Scotland,  and Scotland’s  commitment  to  social  liberties.  This,  in  a  sense,
creates the idea that Scottish separatism is entwined with cosmopolitanism, and stands in
opposition to Brexit-voting England (Knight, 2017). But also in more subtle ways, Scotland
can also provide an antithesis. The devolved Scottish government has made sure that there
were no university fees for Scottish students in Scottish universities,  whereas other UK
universities still require a 15.000 euro student fee per year (Hunter Blackburn, 2015: 33-4;
New  York  Times,  2011).  All  these  policies  are  attempts  to  establish  Scotland  as  more
socially egalitarian and cosmopolitan than England. 
Still, we must also conclude that Scottish cultural policy seems to focus mostly on matters
of tourism and promotion of local culture for economic purposes. Though this might be
good for business, it doesn’t allow for the development of solid transnational relationships
with foreign actors.  Scotland declared 2009 the ’Year  of  Homecoming’,  focussing on its
diaspora  (Orr,  2008:  315).  As  some  scholars  have  noted,  a  diaspora  can  be  a  strong
mechanism for cultural paradiplomacy, as it gives the actor in question the ability to engage
internationally  with  its  own  people  (Cantir,  2015).  However,  Scotland did  not  take  this
opportunity, but kept its diaspora activities limited to its tourism industry. In that prospect,
Scotland limits its own cultural paradiplomacy to economic benefit. However, Scotland has
created  a  strong  international  personality  which  can  be  the  groundwork  for  a  strong
paradiplomatic endeavour in the coming years.
5.2.2: SCOTLAND AND ECONOMIC PARADIPLOMACY
As trade policy is one of the reserved matters, the Scottish government does not have any
right to make international trade deals or agreements of the sorts (Scottish Parliament,
2017). Aside from not having the appropriate devolved powers, Scotland is a member of
the European Union, which covers matters of free trade. However, as the UK prepares to
move out of the European Union, a new motivation for economic paradiplomacy arises.
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, Prime Minister Theresa May made it clear that
the British government would attempt to negotiate a so-called hard Brexit. This means that
the UK would also leave the European single market and customs union. However, First
Minister Sturgeon, citing the fact that Scotland overwhelmingly voted remain, is adamant in
her  view  that  Scotland should  remain  within  the  European  single  market.  In  order  to
achieve  that,  Sturgeon  argues  for  the  UK,  or  an  either  independent  or  autonomous
Scotland, to enter the European Free Trade Agreement5 (Gallagher, 2017). It seems that, as
the Conservative government is aiming for a hard Brexit, Scotland might attempt to enter
the EFTA on its own. However, Scotland does not have the constitutional rights to enter the
EFTA as a constituent country of the UK, and EFTA-member Norway states that only fully
independent countries can become members of the EFTA (von Ondarza, 2017). Still,  the
current situation is more complex. Prime Minister lost her parliamentary majority in the
2017 snap election, hurting her mandate in the run-up to the Brexit negotiations. Currently,
different stories circulate regarding May’s position on Brexit. Some sources state that her
recent fall from grace will soften the Brexit (Guardian, 2017b), others say that Brexit will
remain hard (Telegraph, 2017), and others argue that a parliamentary-wide approach to the
negotiations must take place (Guardian, 2017c). If May opts for (and succeeds in getting) a
softer Brexit, Scotland might feel reassured, as it keeps some connection to the European
Union. However, opponents of the SNP argue that First Minister Sturgeon is hell-bent on
holding  a  second  independence  referendum  anyways  (Davidson,  2016).  If  a  second
referendum will be held, the hardness of the Brexit and the options for re-entering the EU
are  likely  to  become  major  considerations  for  the  Scots.  It  is  also  possible  that  the
Westminster government, mirroring its actions during the 2014 referendum, would try to
keep  the  Scots  aboard  by  offering  more  devolved  powers.  Scotland’s  economic
paradiplomacy is not only in development, but stands at a crossroads.
52.3: SCOTLAND AND POLITICAL PARADIPLOMACY
Similar to its economic paradiplomacy, Scotland’s political paradiplomacy has been curbed
due to the lack of constitutional abilities, the short amount of time since devolvement, and
a lack of political stability and continuity in the first years since devolution. An early and
5 The European Economic Area is the area containing the European Internal Market, and contains the countries 
that are either member of the European Union or the European Free Trade Agreement. In other words, Scotland 
could remain in the internal market if it left the EU but could get a seat in the EFTA.
minor  attempt  at  political  paradiplomacy  related  to  the  so  called  ‘Arc  of  Prosperity’,
suggested by First Minister Salmond. This arc would unite a number of relatively small but
prosperous countries in Europe’s northwest; Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark
and Finland (Criekemans, 2010: 50). Salmond argues that countries like Iceland, Norway
and Ireland are all relatively new and affluent, just like an independent Scotland would be
(The Scotsman, 2006). Scotland would also fit in relatively well in the members of the arc on
other grounds, as it shares both the general geographical location as well as a general taste
for  social-democratic  politics  with  the  Scandinavians.  Even  so,  the  idea  of  a  Scottish-
Scandinavian  relationship  has  failed  to  developed  into  anything  tangible.  Despite  the
similarities, there seems to be no real interest in adopting or re-imagining Scotland as a
Scandinavian country (The Guardian, 2014). 
The run-up to its independence referendum in 2014 might have been the ideal time for
Scotland to engage in protodiplomacy. First Minister Salmond’s Arc of Prosperity had failed,
and there is no proof that the Scottish government had attempted something else in the
run-up  to  the  referendum.  It  would  be  quite  sensible  if  Scotland  had  attempted  to
strengthen their ties with Brussels, or individual EU members. The Scottish separatist camp
made it clear that Scotland would to become (or remain) an EU-member state if it became
independent,  something which was disputed by the ‘Better Together’  campaign. A solid
political paradiplomatic endeavour towards Brussels might have given Scotland the needed
support for their membership claims. 
That  being  said,  Brexit  has  provided  Scotland  with  new  motivations  to  operate  more
independently from the UK. Scotland sees the EU as a bulwark again Westminster’s power
in  the  UK,  and  thus  has  a  serious  interest  in  remaining  politically  engaged  in  the  EU
(Gallagher,  2017:  32).  This  dynamic  follows  roughly  the  same  argumentation  as  with
Scotland’s economic paradiplomacy; Scotland wishes to remain in the EU, and might go so
far as to hold a second referendum on its independence in order to achieve that goal. At
this stage, it is hard to gauge how the political paradiplomacy of Scotland will develop. It
seems that throughout the Brexit negotiations, First Minister Sturgeon will  push for the
softest possible Brexit. If Westminster keeps steering towards a hard Brexit, then Scotland
will  possibly  adopt  a  protodiplomatic  endeavour,  with  the  aim  of  paving  the  way  for
Scottish independence. That being said, Scottish Conservative leader Davidson points out
that support for independence after an initial Brexit surge is back at pre-Brexit level, and
that  Scots  might  not  want  to  “double  down”  on  political  uncertainty  with  their  own
independence shortly after Brexit (ECFR, 2016). A significant change relative to the 2014
referendum has come from the EU itself instead. The Spanish government has stated that
it will not veto Scotland's EU membership, and if the EU wants to make the UK suffer for its
withdrawal,  it  might  be  more  than  happy  to  assist  Scotland in  becoming  independent
(Guardian, 2017a). In other words, it is hard to see what the future will bring for Scottish
independence,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  current  Scottish  government  will  use
paradiplomacy in an effort to remain as much in the EU as possible.
5.3 CALIFORNIA
In  many ways,  the  State  of  California  both  resembles  and deviates  from Scotland and
Quebec.  On the one hand,  California has a history as an independent nation,  and has
secessionist  movements.  On  the  other  hand,  the  independent  California  Republic  was
unrecognised and only lasted for 22 days. Meanwhile, its independence movement is far
less influential than similar movements in Scotland and Quebec, and seems to be mostly
motivated by the recent election of Donald Trump as president of the United States (NBC
News,  2016).  However,  California  might  have  a  strong  political  motivation  to  use
paradiplomacy  to  go  its  own  way.  A  more  autonomous,  if  not  entirely  independent,
California could finally push through its more radical ambitions regarding gun ownership,
drug laws, and immigration policy (Poulos, 2017). As one of the liberal bulwarks, the state
steps out of line with the more conservative parts of the country. And together with highly
international industries like high-tech and cinema, it would be reasonable to assume that
the state is motivated to engage in paradiplomacy.
5.3.1: CALIFORNIA AND CULTURAL PARADIPLOMACY
As the home of America’s film, music and technology industries, Californian products and
popular culture represent the Golden State throughout the world. The state does not really
need  to  rely  on  a  government-led  campaign  to  develop  an  international  personality.
According to Starr, the 20th century saw California becoming somewhat of a leading state
of the United States, and a socio-cultural and economical trendsetter. It presented its own
version of the American Dream that was more promising in its prospects for everyone who
moved  to  the  Golden  State,  giving  the  state  an  almost  glamourous  appeal  to  most
Americans (Starr, 2009; The Atlantic, 2009). Whereas Quebec and Scotland have attempted
to  modernise  their  international  image,  California  essentially  determines  what  is
considered to be modern in the first place. The state has such a strong hold on American
culture that it does not need to distance itself from it in the way that Quebec needs with
Canada. However, paradiplomacy is not a product of artists or industry, but a centralised
governmental  endeavour  based  on  cultural  identities.  So,  when  it  comes  to  the
establishment  of  an  international  personality,  California  is  in  a  weird  position.  Despite
being  a  cultural  superpower,  California’s  paradiplomacy  in  this  field  is  highly
underdeveloped.
When it comes to actual policies, two different observations can be made. First, Californian
cities  themselves  seem  to  be  keen  to  use  paradiplomacy  (both  political  and  cultural)
outside of the framework of the Californian state. This issue will be discussed in the section
on  political  paradiplomacy.  Second,  California  does  maintain  some  international,
paradiplomatic cultural policies. It has 28 sister state relations, which operate similarly to
sister  cities,  and connect  regions  across  the  world  based on  their  historic,  cultural,  or
societal similarities. These relationships include the Spanish province of Catalonia, famous
(or  infamous)  for  its  independence  movements;  and  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  two
sovereign countries (California State Senate website). And although this presents the idea
that California is as powerful as some sovereign nations, it does not seem to actually tie
into a larger paradiplomatic strategy.
5.3.2: CALIFORNIA AND ECONOMIC PARADIPLOMACY
The  ability  of  California  to  engage  in  economic  paradiplomacy  seems  to  be  limited.
According  to  Bilder,  the  national  government  “is  the  sole  representative  of  the  United
States  in  its  dealings  with  foreign  nations,  that  it  is  entrusted  with  full  and  exclusive
responsibility and control over our nation's foreign relations (...) Thus, states are expressly
forbidden to make treaties (...) and they may make other ’agreements or compacts’ only
with the consent of Congress”.  Despite these very clear terms,  there is some room for
economic paradiplomacy outside of formal agreements. 
Sub-national actors are entirely free to open trade or investment offices, or engage in trade
or investment missions to foreign actors (Bilder, 1989: 823-6). Indeed, California has a trade
and investment office in Shanghai (Governor’s Office of Business & Economic Development
website).  And the  governor  has  partaken  in  22  different  trade  missions  to  at  least  12
different countries since 1984 (Calchamber website). However, a somewhat confounding
aspect of economic paradiplomacy is presented by the National Governors Association for
Best Practices (NGA), who states that at least 24 out of the 50 states, including California,
maintain  “cooperative  trade,  cultural  and/or  educational  agreements  with  Israel”  (NGA,
2003: 12). It is possible that these “cooperative” agreements might be fair game for states,
as long as they are not binding. Another possibility is that these agreements have been
approved by congress,  meaning that there is plenty of  precedent for congress allowing
paradiplomacy to take place. Or the US government could feel that cooperation between
US states and the state of Israel, a close US ally, might not pose any risks. This would mean
that the US government has no intention of blocking paradiplomacy, as long as it is with
trusted  allies.  And  indeed,  blocking  such  cooperation  would  come  across  as  intrusive
interference in local matters by the federal government, and might be seen as inhospitable
behaviour towards Israel (Shuman, 1984: 171). It does seem that California is making an
effort to extend its economic strength by the use of economic paradiplomacy, though it
remains limited in its abilities by the federal government.
5.3.3: CALIFORNIA AND POLITICAL PARADIPLOMACY
There are two political paradiplomacy efforts within the state of California; one operated by
cities, and another based on international environmental policy. First are the large cities,
mostly San Francisco and Los Angeles,  engaging in cultural and political paradiplomacy.
Shuman points out that San Francisco has negotiated trade pacts with Shanghai and Haifa,
has divested hundreds of millions of dollars in funds supporting apartheid,  and its city
council voted to evict the Soviet consulate in 1983 (Shuman, 1986). More recently, both San
Francisco and Los Angeles are members of climate change combating networks as the ICLEI
and C40,  and the  international  network  of  Mayors  for  Peace  (Zaffos,  2016;  Schroeder,
2011). The fact that California has two very internationally active, paradiplomatically-able
cities within its territory could demonstrate the value of paradiplomacy. These cities could
inspire the state to become more paradiplomacy active as well, either in its own right or as
a platform for the cooperative paradiplomatic efforts of San Francisco and Los Angeles.
However, the central question is if the actions of a sub-national actor’s own  sub-national
actor count as paradiplomacy. As these actions and policies are initiated by sub-national
actors that operate independently of either the state’s legislature or executive, they should
not be considered to be the paradiplomacy of the state. 
The  most  overt  way  in  which  California  engages  in  paradiplomacy  itself  is  on  climate
change policy. The state is a member of the Western Climate Initiative, creating a common
emissions  trading  market  with  a  number  of  American  States  and  Canadian  provinces,
including  Quebec  (CBC,  2015).  Prior,  it  moved  to  establish  a  similar  shared  emissions
market with the United Kingdom in response to then-President Bush’s lacklustre climate
policies (Washington Times, 2006). And more recently, after President Trump pledged to
step out of the Paris climate agreements, Californian governor Brown stated he would seek
deals  with  China and Germany in  an effort  to  continue his  state's  commitment to  the
international agreement (Reuters, 2017; Independent, 2017). Here we see that California is
willing and successful  in defying the national government directly,  and maintain a well-
developed political paradiplomacy.
6: ANALYSIS
Regarding  to  cultural  paradiplomacy  specifically,  Quebec  stands  out  due  to  its  French
language and its special relationship with France. It is thanks to this distinct character as a
francophone nation in an Anglo-Saxon federation that Quebec can establish relations with
the  Francophonie  and  France  on  its  own.  The  relationships  with  France  and  the
Francophonie  gives  the  province  a  level  of  international  legitimacy  that  forms  the
groundwork of  Quebec’s  entire  paradiplomacy.  Like Quebec,  Scotland has been able to
emphasise its distinctive character from England,  and adopt an international personality.
Still,  the  political  instability  in  the  early  years  of  Scottish  parliament  did  not  do  the
development of cultural paradiplomacy any favours (Bonnar, 2014: 145). Also limiting its
development of cultural paradiplomacy is Scotland’s lack of any sort of ‘special relationship’,
like Quebec has with France. Scotland does feel strongly about its membership of the EU,
but  is  not  able  to  make  the  cultural  and  ethnic  arguments  that  Quebec  can  make.
California,  however,  has  even  more  interesting  handicap.  The  Golden  State  is  a  socio-
cultural and economic behemoth that plays an important role in how the United State sees
itself. Because of this, it cannot effectively distinguish itself from the national culture. This
also limits the state abilities in creating a special relationship, as any country with a cultural
bond with California would have an almost  equally  strong bond with the entire United
States. 
When  it  comes  to  economic  paradiplomacy,  Quebec  again  comes  off  as  the  most
developed of the three. The big difference between the cases here is that Quebec has the
authority to make binding international agreements, which neither Scotland or California
have. However, the Scottish nationalists-controlled government seems to be determined to
start  serious economic and political  paradiplomacy. Though California is also limited to
engage in trade policy, it is more active in sending trade missions throughout the world. So
while Scotland and California are trying to develop economic paradiplomacy in specific
places, they both remain stifled by constitutional limitations.
When  considering  political  paradiplomacy,  the  willingness  and  successes  of  the  sub-
national actors become more diverse. Again, Quebec takes the lead in the development of
paradiplomacy.  Whereas  Quebec  relies  heavily  on  its  special  relationship  with  France,
Scotland lacks such a relationship, and failed to establish a protodiplomatic effort in the
run-up  to  its  independence  referendum.  It  does  seem  that  the  current  nationalist
government  is  considering a  protodiplomatic  relationship with  the  EU,  to  maintain  the
possibility of re-entering the EU as an independent Scotland. This form of paradiplomacy is
simply  absent  in  California.  However,  the  Golden  State  uses  paradiplomacy  to
counterbalance  the  American  climate  change  policies.  It  maintains  a  number  of
international environmental agreements, an effort it’s seemingly strengthening in reaction
to the Trump administration. A more vigorous display of paradiplomatic counterbalancing
can be found in the case of Quebec, which took its entire environmental policy into its own
hand  during  the  Harper  administration.  Scotland is  developing  protodiplomacy  but  no
environmental  policy,  California  has  a  developed  environmental  policy  but  no
protodiplomacy, and Quebec has a very developed paradiplomacy on both matters.
So, we can conclude that these similar case studies do not yield similar results. Quebec has
well-developed paradiplomatic policies across the board, while Scotland is currently in a
developmental  stage.  California  is  the  most  diverse  in  its  developments,  with  a  solid
political  paradiplomacy  on  international  environmental  matters,  but  seemingly  no  real
willingness or ability to commit to paradiplomatic efforts on protodiplomacy or cultural
paradiplomacy. The question that remains is what factors can explain this divergence in
paradiplomatic  development.  The  research  has  identified  four  of  such  factors;
distinctiveness, constitutional ability, foreign connections, and administrative set-up.
The first  identified factor  is  distinctiveness,  or  how culturally  different  the  sub-national
actor is from its host nation. A sub-national actor with a cultural identity that stands in
contrast  with  the  national  culture  has  more  leverage  to  demand  more  administrative
freedom, and can use that identity to signal to foreign actors that it is willing to engage with
them independently from its host nation. This is why the first step of paradiplomacy is the
creating and expression of cultural identity and distinctiveness. The Quebecois have used
the French language for  this  purpose,  the Scots might  use its  pro-European and social
democratic values, and Californians might use their liberal mind-set to achieve the same
goal.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  more  politically  oriented  argument  by  Scotland  and
California  (falling  back  on  cosmopolitan  and liberal  values)  is  less  convincing  than  the
cultural  identity  of  Quebec.  The fact  that  California  is  essentially  the  cultural  hegemon
within the United States, makes it nearly impossible for it to set itself culturally apart from
the rest of the country. The more distinctive the culture of the sub-national actor is from
the host nation, the stronger the paradiplomacy can become.
The second identified factor is constitutional ability, which is the level to which the sub-
national actor is legally able to engage in foreign affairs. National government want to keep
in control of foreign policy, but might allow sub-national actors to conduct paradiplomacy
based on the distinctive identity discussed above. This means that sub-national actors can
take an active role to push for paradiplomacy, and the more autonomous the sub-national
actor  becomes,  the more it  can stress  its  distinctive identity.  The Gérin-Lajoie  Doctrine
forms the legal basis for Quebec’s highly developed paradiplomacy, and is a good example
of how sub-national actors can give themselves more autonomy.
The  third  identified  factor  is  foreign  connection,  which  is  the  availability  of  a  special
relationship to  build  paradiplomacy on.  Quebec has greatly  benefited from the  role  of
France and the Francophonie in its paradiplomacy. These foreign connections tapped into
the  heart  of  Quebec’s  cultural  identity,  legitimised  that  identity,  and functioned as  the
anchor  of  Quebec’s  foreign  affairs.  Scotland  might  attempt  to  make  such  a  special
relationship with the EU, in order to maintain it as a counterweight to Westminster and for
support for its possible independence. However, such a special relation is built upon strong
cultural or ethnic kinship, which Quebec has with France, but Scotland lacks with the EU.
Because  California  lacks  the  cultural  distinctiveness  that  Quebec  and  Scotland  have
embraced,  it  might  be  impossible  for  the  state  to  really  find  a  special  relationship.
Countries that share such a cultural identity with California share that equally with the rest
of the US.
The fourth identified factor is administrative set-up, which describes how the local political
and executive environment.  The research has shown two clear examples of this factor at
play. The first case is that of Quebec, which maintains its own ministry of foreign affairs,
which  employs  more  paradiplomatic  personnel  than  all  fifty  US  states  combined.  The
second case is that of Scotland, which had to endure unstable governments for its first
years since devolution, making it hard for a coherent paradiplomatic policy to take shape.
The way that the government itself  is set-up can play a role too.  The more centralised
Quebec  government  is  better  able  to  form  a  coherent  paradiplomatic  policy  than  the
Scottish, who has a more coordinating role over various agencies (Criekemans, 2010: 40-1).
Quebec shows that a strong bureaucracy can make strong paradiplomacy, while Scotland
shows that a weak government can only make weak paradiplomacy.
7: CONCLUSION
This thesis has looked at how cultural, economic and political paradiplomacy has developed
in  Quebec,  Scotland  and  California,  in  an  attempt  to  find  what  factors  influence  the
development  of  paradiplomacy.  The  research  shows  that  even  in  similar  cases,
paradiplomacy does not develop similarly. Quebec is by far the most well developed across
all three categories, while Scotland is mostly still in a developmental phase. California is the
most irregularly developed, with a strong international climate change policy, but a very
undeveloped  protodiplomacy  and  only  haphazard  efforts  in  matters  of  cultural
paradiplomacy. The fact that paradiplomacy is so unevenly developed in these three sub-
national  actors  teaches  us  that  paradiplomacy  is  not  a  given,  and that  for  many  sub-
national actors, paradiplomacy is still in its infancy.
Still, despite or even thanks to its uneven development, this thesis identified four broad
factors that determine the development of paradiplomacy. First, paradiplomacy is usually
dependent  on  the  sub-national  actor’s  distinctiveness  from  the  host  nation.  The  more
different the sub-national actor is from its host nation, the more autonomy it can claim.
That autonomy can be used to start a paradiplomatic effort, and indicate to foreign actors
that this sub-national actor is willing to engage with them directly. Second, paradiplomacy
is determined by the autonomy of the sub-national actor. As obvious as this sounds, it does
not mean that sub-national actors without much authority are doomed to remain without
paradiplomacy. By using the lessons learned from the first factor, the sub-national actor
can develop itself into an internationally recognised personality, and use that personality as
leverage to push for more autonomy. Third, a sub-national actor with a special relationship
has a better developed paradiplomacy than others. The development of paradiplomacy is
dependent on how foreign actors allow to develop. If  a sub-national actor has a strong
cultural  connection  to  a  foreign  actor,  it  can  use  that  bond  as  a  springboard  for  the
development of its paradiplomacy. The foreign actor can provide initial legitimacy to the
sub-national actor, while the sub-national actor has a friend on whom the paradiplomacy
can  be  built  on.  Fourth,  the  way  the  sub-national  actor’s  government  functions  can
determine  the  efficiency  and  success  of  paradiplomacy.  The  infrastructure  on  which
paradiplomacy is built is naturally an influence on the strength of that paradiplomacy. If a
sub-national actor has its own foreign ministry, its infrastructure is relatively strong. While if
the sub-national actor has a string of unstable governments, it becomes harder to form a
coherent paradiplomatic policy. 
However,  there  remains  much  to  be  explored.  This  thesis  only  looked  at  how
paradiplomacy develops in three fairly similar cases, and found that these development
differ significantly. This means that further research in more diverse cases should result in
much more information in the ways how paradiplomacy is developed. Instead of Anglo-
Saxon, federal or devolved counties, other cultures and forms of government ought to be
discussed. And as this thesis only looked at states and provinces, further research would
need to look at cities and municipalities. Likewise, more research is necessary on the types
of  paradiplomacy.  Even though this  thesis  looked at  the most  promising and common
expressions,  paradiplomacy includes an almost  limitless  array  of  policies.  This  research
might have found a different set of factors if a different set of paradiplomatic policies had
been analysed.
Even with these limitations, this research has given us a springboard for further research.
The way that paradiplomacy has developed in these three cases, and the four determining
factors that formed its groundwork, have given us a glimps into the emerging new world of
paradiplomacy. 
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